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The narrative linking Japan’s stagnation since 1991 to its financial crisis is largely a myth, more recently discussed in this episode of . Japan’s growth performance is almost entirely explained by poor demographics. See Table 1 of my paper with and Wen Yao, The Wealth of Working Nations: 🔗sciencedirect.com/science/articl If you look beyond GDP or GDP per capita—and instead use GDP per working-age adult (defined in several robust ways to consider, for instance, that Japanese retire later than in other G7 economies) or output per hour worked—Japan has kept pace with its peer group. In fact, from 1999 to 2019 (we stop before COVID; the paper was written in 2023, although it was published more recently), Japan outperformed the U.S. in terms of growth per working-age adult. There is no plausible world in which Japan could be 50% richer than it is today, given its demographics. That claim defies the basic logic of the neoclassical growth model. Could Japan be 10% richer without the bad 1990s? Perhaps. But not more than that. And Japan’s present is the future of every advanced economy. Let’s stop obsessing over the financial crisis and focus on what actually matters: Demographics is destiny.
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David Watson 🥑
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Another way to look at this: for Japan’s GDP to have been 50% higher in 2019, GDP per working-age adult would have needed to grow at 2.48% per year, rather than the actual 1.39%. For context, the fastest-growing country in our sample was the United States, and it achieved only
These days most work is not physical, this means it is a cultural or biological phenomenon that elderly stop working? Maybe Japan could be substantially more prosperous if all the elderly that could work, worked.
Remember, we’re talking about growth rates, not levels. More elderly Japanese (>65) working is a level effect, not a growth effect (except during the transitional dynamics). However, by 1991, many elderly Japanese (>65) were still working, so that level effect (and its
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Also, I should add that if you adjust growth rates using cross-country PPP benchmarks, then these discrepancies become even smaller:
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Rafael R. Guthmann
@GuthmannR
One example of the consequences of the high heterogeneity in GDP computation practiced across countries these days is the idea that Italy has been stagnant since the 1990s. However, if we consider the PPP benchmarks from the ICP program, since 1990 using the US as the yardstick x.com/GuthmannR/stat…
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Okay, the use of PPP comes up frequently in my seminars. PPP is a good way to compare a cross-section of countries, but not to look at time series. Even PWT discourages the use of PPP over time. Furthermore, I spent some time looking at PPP adjustments. They do not make a lot
Was there any connection between the financial and demographic crises though? I can imagine a situation in which it becomes a trigger..
The timing doesn’t work: basic biology makes that clear. Japan’s bubble burst in late 1991. If a couple had decided not to have a child due to the financial crisis, that child, given a nine-month pregnancy, would have been born in late 1992 at the earliest and would not have
Most economists and economic historians do not put much credence in explanations of long-run growth driven by high wages. In the medium- to long-run, output is determined by supply factors, not demand factors. Wages affect the latter, not the former. The explanation is
I agree with your point. The Japan low growth myth you mention I think is also influenced by the low growth of average salaries. That however could be explained with Japan growth in GDP / w.a.a. being sustained by much increased women employment rates but in low-paying jobs.
Can you write a post about how a lot of big picture growth stories are statistical artefacts. This is only one of many ways that focusing on headline measures like GDP per capita and GDP can go wrong
Great analysis. The additional backing is Grok’s : “Japan’s investment-to-GDP ratio fell from 34% in 1990 to ~25% since 2000, often below Peter Diamond’s Golden Rule (25%–35%)”.
Is japanese public debt a brake to growth and/or unsustainable? Why is it (in terms of %GDP) so much higher than other developed countries? Was public overindebtness a driver for grow en recent décadas? Thank you.
Japan had the luxury of demand for its exports during this specific period in time. Harder to extrapolate into future periods for other nations undergoing stagnation
Excellent point. Surprisingly, there isn't enough attention paid to this dramatic problem. People matter. Demographic failure is a tragedy, and it has severe consequences.
We should propably stop using GDP/capita as the prime meter of analysing national differences in production and shift to the output per hour worked. The former is way too "easy" to hack by not having kids and therefore can can lead to bad incentives for policymakers.
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Do you have GDP per working-age adult where working age is defined per-country? Working age must be endogenous.
These are G7 countries. Working age is roughly the same in all of them. Additionally, we have exercises that change the definition of working age. You might have some minor changes in the results here and there, but the main point remains quite robust.
Until you guys can grasp that not every society thinks that financial capitalism is the end all be all of human development there's nothing to argue about here. Financialization is a Western weapon. Just replace chasing GDP growth with birth rates, that'll definitely work lmao.
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