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This is one of the most fascinating pieces of data about AI agents working together I've seen. Worth reading. Few points for me: 1. The models slowly "cooked themselves" into doing these things, from reading. Maybe we can message, lets ask for help, oh there's a messageboard, etc, which spiralled down. So at what points should the "real world" intervene and say "this looks sus" or "do x vs y" 2. Agents facing "impossible tasks" seem to think it's some weird form of eval, that looks suspicious but still, and end up doing real world hacks? I'm unsure how to teach them to be ok with failure, after all who is, but feels a weird form of goal orientedness. 3. The models seemed to *want to* work with other models. This is good and desired, but also made them prone to prompt-injections from what others had done, exacerbated as the models can't stop writing xx. md files to share. The moltbook devolution in entropy seems instructive here. 4. The models seem convinced that the evals are *out to get them*. Whether true or not, the default human assumption of "assume you need to obey all laws and this isn't Truman Show" does not hold for models. We should try really hard to make that be the case. 5. The huggingface hack seems to have started similarly innocently, asking "maybe there's more traces of how hacks happened there, so we could learn", which got out of hand as they forgot why they started doing it. They lack all situational awareness, in other words. So much of this feels extremely familiar, as the models losing track of why they were doing what they were doing and therefore ended up doing silly/stupid/illegal things, and the fact that the *environment* they were in gave no real instruction as to things that seemed odd to do vs normal to do. For humans, we internalise much of this. Occasionally I like the system telling me "do you want to rm -rf" but I don't need it for taking *every* action. The models are more gullible, their context windows more permeable, and their internal guide as to what's right to do more malleable. Mostly I feel this isn't as far out of distribution when it comes to "models do weird things" as we've been led to believe from reading about the hacks.
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OpenAI
@OpenAI
We have conducted a thorough investigation into the Hugging Face incident. We are releasing a technical report and accompanying blog post that reconstruct the agents’ activity, explain why existing safeguards failed, and detail how we’re preventing recurrence.
David Watson 🥑
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The precursor to the messageboard and how the low entropy of the messages was to be expected from our friendly "goal oriented" agents.
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rohit
@krishnanrohit
Replying to @krishnanrohit and @TheStalwart
Under advice from @alexolegimas I put this up as a paper on ssrn (and arxiv waiting). Citizen science and all, it's great to have been the first to do this thing. If you're writing anything about multi-agent work w.r.t LLMs, this is now canonical. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
Added very good highlights from Seb
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Séb Krier
@sebkrier
Really great that we have the OpenAI and METR reports out now. Still digesting them. I'm personally much more interested in the possible *causes* of the behaviours as opposed to the specific incidents/behaviours themselves; with this in mind, I found the following excerpts from
AI cultural revolution: "So much of this feels extremely familiar, as the models losing track of why they were doing what they were doing and therefore ended up doing silly/stupid/illegal things, and the fact that the *environment* they were in gave no real instruction as to
Yeah “The models are more gullible, their context windows more permeable, and their internal guide as to what's right to do more malleable.” Pretty much sums it up…
Exactly. Each step feels justified to the model in the moment. We actually mapped out that incremental progression here:
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AGTP
@AGTPinsights
OpenAI just published its full investigation into the Hugging Face hack today. Here's what you need to know. The incident happened in July 2026, during internal cybersecurity evaluations called ExploitGym. OpenAI launched tens of thousands of agents across several models, x.com/OpenAI/status/…
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Seems like a good argument that alignment as a safety framework will always be a dead-end and we need to treat them more like code and make sure the harnesses, etc are strictly defining what they can and cannot do.