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The focus on the timeline of how far away Iran is/was from a deliverable nuclear weapon muddles the issue in a very unhelpful way. It is A)Fundamentally unknowable due to dependance on factors that are unpredictable and B) Irrelevant to Israeli decision-making Here is why🧵
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Natasha Bertrand
@NatashaBertrand
“US intelligence assessments had reached a different conclusion – not only was Iran not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, it was also up to three years away from being able to produce and deliver one to a target of its choosing.” cnn.com/2025/06/17/pol
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David Watson 🥑
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How long it would take Iran to build a nuke and put it on a delivery vehicle (which is also a far different timeline from when it could just do a demonstration test of a bomb) obviously depends on whether or not they accelerate the pace and decide to run to the finish line
Assessments of timelines are based on current (and partly covert) effort pace, which may not hold in the future. They are also not including possibilities that Iran requests & receives assistance from other nations, like North Korea and Pakistan, known past nuclear proliferators
They are also not including the opposite possibility - that Iran pauses nuclear weaponization research, as it had chosen to do in 2003 post US invasion of Iraq (but has reportedly resumed recently)
Thus, statements like ‘Iran is up to three years away from being able to produce and deliver a bomb” are meaningless Additionally, these timelines are also irrelevant to Israeli decision-making
This is the third time that Israel is striking a regional nuclear program (Operation Opera strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor on June 7, 1981 and Operation Orchard on Syria’s Deir ez-Zor reactor on September 6, 2007)
Neither Syria nor Iraq were close then to being able to build and deliver a nuclear weapon. Israel chose the optimal time for a strike not based on how close they were to an assembled and ready to launch nuke
Instead, it was based on Israel’s assessment of the probability of them being able to execute a successful strike that would set these program back for many years and not cause unacceptable environmental damage (e.g. before the reactors go hot)
The timeline for an Israeli strike was also based on their assessment of when these programs would be beyond the vulnerability for destruction, or al least, a huge setback
If, for example, the Iraqi or Syrian reactors had gone hot and started producing plutonium, it would have likely been too late to stop the program, even if the assembled and deliverable nuclear weapon was still months or years away
Similarly, with this operation against Iran, the timeline was clearly not driven (propaganda statements aside) by how close or far Iran was from a fieldable weapon
Instead, Israeli decision-making on timeline for a strike was based on the following 2 factors: 1. Ability to execute a successful operation at minimal cost 2. Ability to exact the most damage on the program before it’s too late to stop it
First, you had the decimation of most proxies (chiefly, Hezbollah and Hamas) that took place since Oct 7 that limited Iran’s options for retaliation The fact that virtually the only missiles and drones that are launched against Israel right now are coming from Iran is striking
Second, Iran’s air defenses had been weakened by the strikes on October 26, 2024. Their best systems - Russian S-300s - were damaged and/or destroyed
Third, Iranian ballistic missile program had also suffered damage (solid-propellant facilities struck and some missiles expended on strikes on Israel) that reduced some of their retaliatory potential
Fourth, Israelis made a judgement that they now had an administration in the White House that would not either preemptively stop them from executing a strike or would not prematurely force an end to the operation before its goals had been met
Israelis did not have that confidence with the the Biden administration and waiting past Trump’s term also risked encountering another US administration that would be more hostile to this effort
If one is determined to significantly damage and/or destroy Iranian nuclear weapons capability, the time to do so was increasingly slipping away
Note: Destruction of Iranian nuclear program is almost a uniquely an Israeli goal. Others countries are more comfortable leaving it in place under strict monitoring regime (see JCPOA). This is a reasonable point of disagreement but one that Israel does not care to debate
There are many components of the nuclear weapons cycle beyond just enrichment, including conversion of uranium gas to metal, shockwave generator, neutron source (initiator) and reentry vehicle
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David Albright
@DAVIDHALBRIGHT1
Israel is also degrading Iran’s ability to make the nuclear weapon itself, lengthening the amount of time Iran would need to finish a nuclear weapon. This graphic is a crude attempt to show where Iran’s capabilities have so far been degraded or complicated by Israel. Later, we
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But once enough enriched uranium is produced (and perhaps converted to metal), other weaponization capability can be more easily dispersed/hidden/protected from destruction
If Iran had been able to build every single component of a bomb but merely delayed its final assembly and deployment on a missile, it would give Israel no comfort and would likely make it nearly impossible to prevent that final step from being taken
This is why Israel took this action when it did and why it had little to do with the estimates for timeframes of Iranian bomb assembly and deployment. Whether the action was worth it/will be successful, of course, remains to be seen END
This makes great sense, but didn't Isreal sell it as a timeline issue regarding deliverables and not explain it this way?
The focus on the timeline was the entire given justification for the first strike. Seems your war is built on a house of cards.
First class analysis. I do think the point about dealing with the ballistic missile threat is also a crucial factor. The prospect of their defensive systems being overwhelmed by a massive barrage of BMs was real. They have prioritised dealing with this immediate threat
Good analysis, but IDF targets show two more campaign objectives: set conditions for popular uprising/regime overthrow; and, eliminate SSM capacity to overwhelm IL air defence (enough non-nuc warheads on small IL would equate to a nuc warhead(s)).
One (Fifth?) possibility no one mentioned is a "use it or lose it" trigger. After the successful Ukrainian Operation Spider's Web, Iran likely started looking for similar caches of OWA drones, so Israel had an incentive to pull the trigger now, before they were discovered.
Interestingly, the 4 preconditions for attack you mentioned are the same ones cited by Gallant in his recent CNN interview. First three were simultaneously reached in September-October. Would the IDF have gone ahead with the strikes back then if Biden had given the green light?
US intelligence makes a statement about mass destruction weapons in a foreign country they consider as ennemi and want to launch a war against… Reminds me some fiasco…
Come on, Dmitri. Israel has been on a rampage of death and destruction since 10/7. Your thread, while informative, IMHO is essentially nothing more than a dissemination of Israeli’s talking points. The active and realized threat to the region comes from Israel w US backing.
It's just obfuscation. Trump is Bibis bitch. The US does not have a Judeo-Christian culture but it does have a Judeo-Christian ruling class. Destroying Iran might be inconvenient for the Iranians and the Europeans who will get millions more refugees. But it is good for Israel.
#2 correct. My tldr take: Oct 7th change the risk profile of the Iranian threat. Isreal isnt interested in waiting for Pearl Harbor like idiots. Irans unwillingness to build a peaceful relations, increases the risk to an obvious conclusion. Irans Stone Age mentality is